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DELUSIVE EXACTNESS IN CALIFORNIA: 
REDEFINING THE CLAIM 
Kami LaBerge* 
 
          My view of primary right may differ from yours, and we have no 
common ground, only the statement of our opposing views.1 
  
 
 * J.D., 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.S. Library Science, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012; B.A. Art History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010. 
Many thanks to Professor Simona Grossi, whose continuous love and support made this Article 
possible. Thank you to Jason de Jesus, who provided thoughtful comments throughout the writing 
process. And, of course, thank you to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 
 1. Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 827 (1924). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When does a legal dispute between two parties end? The doctrine 
of res judicata, under which courts give certain conclusive effect to a 
prior judgment involving the same controversy as subsequent 
litigation, answers that question.2 Res judicata comprises two distinct 
forms.3 In its first form—claim preclusion4—it bars parties from 
relitigating a claim already litigated, or that might have been litigated, 
in a prior proceeding.5 In its second form—issue preclusion—it bars 
parties from relitigating issues that were litigated in a prior 
proceeding.6 This Article focuses on California’s application of res 
judicata’s first form—claim preclusion.7 
Under general claim preclusion principles, a prior proceeding 
bars present litigation when: (1) the claim raised in the present 
litigation is identical to a claim litigated in the prior proceeding; (2) the 
prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the 
parties are the same or in privity with the parties to the prior 
proceeding.8 Thus, whether a prior action bars a second depends 
largely on how a court defines a “claim” and how broadly or narrowly 
it construes that definition. In California, that definition is grounded 
in the nineteenth-century primary rights theory, under which a claim 
is an invasion of a “primary right.”9 Although California courts have 
characterized a primary right as “simply the plaintiff’s right to be free 
 
 2. People v. Barragan, 83 P.3d 480, 492 (Cal. 2004). 
 3. Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916, 918 (Cal. 1934). 
 4. “While the United States Supreme Court uses the term ‘res judicata’ to refer collectively 
to claim preclusion and issue preclusion, the California Supreme Court generally uses the term ‘res 
judicata’ to refer to claim preclusion, and the term ‘collateral estoppel’ to refer to issue preclusion.” 
Renowitzky v. Shellpoint Mortg. Serving, No. 3:15-CV-01016-LB, 2015 WL 4881435, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 14, 2015). For purposes of clarity, this Article uses the term “claim preclusion.” 
 5. Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 302 (Cal. 2002). The claim preclusion 
doctrine is said to act as “bar” and “merger” to subsequent litigations; claims which were actually 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding are barred, and claims which might have been litigated are merged 
into the prior judgment. See Arlo E. Smith, Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CAL. L. REV. 
412, 419 (1952). 
 6. Barragan, 83 P.3d at 492. 
 7. For an informative overview of both claim and issue preclusion, see ALLAN IDES & 
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, The Binding Effect of a Final Judgment, in CIVIL PROCEDURE 121920 
(4th ed. 2012). 
 8. Mycogen Corp., 51 P.3d at 302. 
 9. Walter W. Heiser, California’s Unpredictable Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Doctrine, 
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 559, 571 (1998). 
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from the particular injury suffered,”10 application of the doctrine has 
been anything but simple. After all, 
[w]hat is “one existing, primary right”? We might start with 
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as a 
broad definition and narrow it down almost to the vanishing 
point, and unless it was known what purpose we intended to 
subserve by our definition we could hardly be criticized.11 
Two policy considerations underlie the claim preclusion 
doctrine:12 first, the consideration of fairness—that a party should not 
be vexed by a matter already litigated; and second, the consideration 
of efficiency—that it is in the public interest to preserve the court’s 
limited resources.13 Thus, claim preclusion is intended to be a 
predictable doctrine—a promoter of reliance and repose.14 But rather 
than serving this purpose, California’s primary rights approach is 
ambiguous to both litigants and the courts, resulting in an inconsistent 
and chaotic doctrine. This “[u]ncertainty intrinsically works to defeat 
the opportunities for repose and reliance sought by the rules of 
preclusion, and confounds the desire for efficiency by inviting 
repetitious litigation to test the preclusive effects of the first effort.”15 
California is the only state that has not yet discarded the primary 
rights approach.16 In contrast, most jurisdictions define a “claim” by 
the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which an 
 
 10. Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal. 1994), as modified (Nov. 30, 1994). 
 11. Clark, supra note 1, at 819. 
 12. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J.) 
(Claim preclusion “must be treated as a compromise between two conflicting interests: the 
convenience of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and the adequacy of the remedies afforded for 
conceded wrongs.”). 
 13. Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1944) (Claim preclusion serves two purposes: 
“(1) [t]hat the defendant should be protected against vexatious litigation; and (2) that it is against 
public policy to permit litigants to consume the time of the courts by relitigating matters already 
judicially determined, or by asserting claims which properly should have been settled in some prior 
action.”). 
 14. Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 302 (Cal. 2002) (“A predictable doctrine 
of res judicata benefits both the parties and the courts because it seeks to curtail multiple litigation 
causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial 
administration.”). 
 15. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4407 (2d ed. 
2015). 
 16. “State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the 
relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes,” so long as those rules 
comport with constitutional due process. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996). 
For a list of the claim preclusion approaches applied by each state, see Alan M. Trammell, 
Transactionalism Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 1211, 1270 (2014). 
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action arose.17 Under this transactional approach, claim preclusion 
applies when a suit involves the same “group of operative facts” as 
prior litigation.18 Although California’s pleading and joinder rules 
have embraced a transactional approach, its claim preclusion doctrine 
has yet to pierce the modern litigation world.19 As a progressive state 
in many other areas of law, it is time for California to release its grasp 
on the outdated primary rights approach and adopt a transactional 
model.20 
Part II of this Article provides a brief historical background of the 
primary rights approach to claim preclusion, then explains the same-
transaction-or-occurrence approach applied by federal courts. Part III 
considers early criticisms of primary rights, then examines the 
difficulties California and federal courts have had in applying the 
primary rights doctrine and defining the scope of a “primary right.” 
Part IV recommends that California adopt the same-transaction-or-
occurrence approach, then discusses the judicial and legislative 
avenues through which California could make that transition. It further 
recommends that the California legislature enact a res judicata statute 
barring subsequent actions arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence. Part V concludes that the time is ripe for California to take 
action to redefine its claim for purposes of preclusion. 
II.  DEFINING THE CLAIM 
A.  California and the Primary Right 
As a preliminary matter, California does not use the term “claim” 
in the preclusion context.21 Rather, it uses the phrase “cause of action,” 
 
 17. See Trammell, supra note 16, at 1270; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes 
the plaintiff’s claim . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected 
transactions, out of which the action arose.”). 
 18. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 477 (2d ed. 1947) 
(defining a claim as “a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more rights of action”). 
 19. California’s claim preclusion doctrine is grounded in pre-1972 rules of pleading that 
severely limited the causes of action that could be pleaded in a single litigation unit. See discussion 
infra Section II.A. 
 20. Walter W. Heiser and Robin James encouraged California to abandon this approach in 
1998 and 1989, respectively. Heiser, supra note 9; Robin James, Comment, Res Judicata: Should 
California Abandon Primary Rights, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351 (1989). California’s continued use 
of this approach since then has only served to further muddle its claim preclusion law. See 
discussion infra Section III.B, III.C. 
 21. Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1975). 
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which it defines as the violation of a primary right, rather than the legal 
theory asserted.22 Yet California also uses “cause of action” 
“indiscriminately . . . to mean counts which state [according to 
different legal theories] the same cause of action . . . .”23 Because the 
meaning of “cause of action” is context-dependent, it “remains elusive 
and subject to dispute and misconception.”24 To avoid that 
misconception, this Article uses the term “claim” in its discussion of 
res judicata.25 
In California, courts have consistently applied the primary rights 
approach to define a “claim” for purposes of preclusion.26 That 
approach developed from nineteenth century rules of pleading, when 
legal and equitable remedies were administered by different courts.27 
And in courts of law, strict procedural requirements often prevented 
parties from asserting different legal theories arising from the same 
offending conduct.28 This limitation appears in an early California 
joinder statute, the California Practice Act of 1851.29 That Act divided 
claims that could be joined in a single action into seven categories, 
each based on a separate right.30 Plaintiffs could not join claims falling 
into different categories in the same complaint; for example, a plaintiff 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010) (citing Eichler Homes of San 
Mateo, Inc. v. Superior Court, 361 P.2d 914, 916 (Cal. 1961)). 
 24. 4 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 35 (5th ed. 2008). 
 25. See also discussion infra Section IV.B.3.a. 
 26. Boeken, 230 P.3d at 348. 
 27. James, supra note 20, at 356. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 1851 CAL. STAT. 51, 59–60, ch. 5, § 64 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 427 (repealed 1971)). 
 30. Id. The 1851 Act provides: 
The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they all 
arise out of: 
1. Contracts, express or implied; or, 
2. Claims to recover specific real property, with or without damages, for the withholding 
thereof, or for waste committed thereon, and the rents and profits of the same; or, 
3. Claims to recover specific personal property, with or without damages, for the 
withholding thereof; or, 
4. Claims against a trustee, by virtue of contract, or by operation of law; or, 
5. Injuries to character; or, 
6. Injuries to person; or, 
7. Injuries to property. 
But the causes of action so united shall all belong to only one of these classes, and shall 
affect all parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and shall be 
separately stated. 
Id. 
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was required to plead injuries to his person and injuries to his property 
in separate actions.31 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Professor John Norton 
Pomeroy of Hastings College of Law pioneered the primary rights 
approach; he was influenced in part by the California Practice Act of 
1851.32 According to Pomeroy, a “claim” comprised three 
requirements: (1) a plaintiff’s primary right; (2) the defendant’s 
corresponding duty; and (3) a wrong done by the defendant 
constituting a breach of that duty.33 Thus, Pomeroy fixated on whether 
a prior proceeding was based on the same injury to the same right as 
the present litigation.34 Although Pomeroy categorized primary rights 
and duties as those involving persons and those involving things, he 
emphasized that “[t]hese rights and duties are, of course, innumerable 
in their variety, nature, and extent.”35 
The merger of courts of law and equity allowed for broader 
joinder.36 In 1971, California abolished the joinder categories, 
repealing Section 427 in favor of a broad joinder rule allowing a 
plaintiff to unite all claims he has against any defendant.37 
Nevertheless, California courts continue to administer Pomeroy’s 
three prongs to determine whether two actions involve the same 
claim.38 
B.  The Restatement and the Same Transaction or Occurrence 
In response to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, which allowed for liberal joinder of claims, federal 
 
 31. Id. In 1907, California amended this statute to include an eighth category: “Claims arising 
out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action, and not 
included within one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section.” Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of 
Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 
23 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1970). As Friedenthal explained, the eighth category was of little use to 
litigants because the paragraph following the listing of categories, which required united claims to 
belong only to one class, precluded joining claims arising out of the same transaction if any claim 
fell within one of the other seven categories. Id. at 3. 
 32. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS § 453 (1876) [hereinafter 
Pomeroy Remedies]; JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 8995 (1881) 
[hereinafter Pomeroy Equity]. For a more comprehensive discussion of Pomeroy’s scholarship, see 
Heiser, supra note 9, at 57172 n.37. 
 33. Heiser, supra note 9, at 57172 n.37. 
 34. Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 595 (Cal. 1975). 
 35. Pomeroy Equity, supra note 32, §§ 9192 (emphasis added). 
 36. James, supra note 20, at 384. 
 37. Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10(a) (West 2015). 
 38. See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). 
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courts began to acknowledge the necessary evolution of the definition 
of a claim.39 Pleadings focused not on framing a single legal issue, but 
on facts supporting relief under multiple legal theories.40 Thus, courts 
began to concentrate on those facts to define a claim brought under 
modern pleading standards.41 
Acknowledging modern joinder rules, in 1982, the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (“Restatement”) recommended a 
“transactional” approach, defining a claim by “the transaction, or 
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.”42 
Under the Restatement, courts assess the transaction “pragmatically, 
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related 
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient 
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ 
expectations or business understanding or usage.”43 
Over the following decades, many federal courts embraced the 
Restatement’s guidance, and by 2011, the United States Supreme 
Court had acknowledged that “[t]he now-accepted test in preclusion 
law for determining whether two suits involve the same claim or cause 
of action depends on factual overlap, barring claims arising from the 
same transaction.”44 
III.  A DOCTRINE IN CHAOS 
“[E]ven in the 19th century it was not uncommon to identify a 
claim for preclusion purposes based on facts rather than relief.”45 
 
 39. See, e.g., Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1950) 
(“[T]he meaning of ‘cause of action’ for res judicata purposes is much broader today than it was 
earlier.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Herendeen v. Champion Int’l Corp., 525 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding 
“essential facts” in the prior and subsequent actions relevant to determining whether the claims are 
the same); Moreno v. Marbil Prods., Inc., 296 F.2d 543, 544 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating that claim 
preclusion applies when “the essential facts in the [prior] action and in the present action are the 
same.”). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, § 24. 
 43. Id. For an example of a court’s consideration of the factors enumerated in the Restatement, 
see Porn v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 44. United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 316 (2011). This contrasts with 
the Court’s early twentieth-century decisions embracing the primary rights approach. See, e.g., 
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) (“A cause of action does not consist of 
facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the 
facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be 
considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong.”). 
 45. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 316; see also J. WELLS, RES ADJUDICATA AND 
STARE DECISIS § 241 (1878) (“The true distinction between demands or rights of action which are 
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Professor Charles Clark, providing some of the earliest criticisms of 
the primary rights approach, stated that “[w]e think that in speaking of 
‘one existing, primary right’ we have discovered a mathematically 
exact test which will dispense with brains upon the part of the judge.”46 
But he explained that the approach did anything but dispense with 
judges’ gray matter.47 Rather, it did not allow for practical application 
because it carried no real meaning; the primary rights approach was, 
in a word, elusive.48 And it continues to elude courts applying 
California preclusion law. 
A.  The California Supreme Court on Primary Rights 
1.  Primary Rights Until 2010 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the California Supreme 
Court, citing Pomeroy’s scholarship, adopted the three-prong 
approach to define a claim: a plaintiff’s primary right, the defendant’s 
corresponding duty, and the defendant’s breach of that duty.49 By the 
late 1970s, California had revised its joinder statutes, and many other 
jurisdictions had adopted the transactional approach.50 Yet the 
California Supreme Court continued to embrace primary rights.51 Its 
1979 decision in Agarwal v. Johnson52 emphasized “that the same 
facts are involved in both suits is not conclusive.”53 But that case 
departed from Pomeroy’s three-prong approach, instead stating that, 
in determining whether two claims are the same, “the significant factor 
is the harm suffered,” upsetting lower courts’ understanding of a 
claim.54 
Since Agarwal, the California Supreme Court has not consistently 
considered the harm suffered in applying its rule of claim preclusion. 
 
single and entire, and those which are several and distinct, is, that the former immediately arise out 
of one and the same act or contract, and the latter out of different acts or contracts.”). 
 46. Clark, supra note 1, at 831. 
 47. Id. at 826. 
 48. Id. See also Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 354, 361 (1934) 
(explaining that “Pomeroy’s primary right” theory “acquires specific content only if identified with 
rights enforced in the old forms of action,” and that there is no “compelling reason for such a 
reversion so foreign to modern procedural ideas.”). 
 49. McKee v. Dodd, 93 P. 854, 855 (Cal. 1908). 
 50. See supra note 41. 
 51. See Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 72. 
 54. Id. For a factual summary of Agarwal, see Heiser, supra note 9, at 58083. 
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In two subsequent decisions in 1994 and 2002, it reverted back to 
Pomeroy’s three-prong approach with no mention of Agarwal or the 
harm suffered by the plaintiffs.55 
2.  Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
The California Supreme Court did not provide additional 
guidance on defining the primary right until 2010, when it decided 
Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.56 There, Boeken’s husband, a long-
time cigarette smoker, was diagnosed with lung cancer.57 Before his 
death, Boeken filed a common law loss of consortium action against a 
cigarette manufacturer in California state court.58 She later dismissed 
that action with prejudice.59 
After her husband died from the effects of lung cancer, Boeken 
brought another action against the same manufacturer, this time for 
wrongful death under a California statute.60 The manufacturer 
demurred, arguing that the suit was barred by California’s claim 
preclusion doctrine because Boeken’s wrongful death action involved 
the same primary right as her previous loss of consortium action.61 The 
trial court sustained the demurrer, and the appellate court affirmed.62 
The California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the 
appellate court, holding that Boeken’s wrongful death action was 
barred by claim preclusion because it involved the same primary 
right—“the right not to be wrongfully deprived of spousal 
companionship and affection”—as her loss of consortium action.63 
The majority applied Agarwal’s “harm suffered” approach, finding 
that both actions involved the plaintiff’s permanent deprivation of her 
husband’s companionship and affection.64 
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s characterization 
of the primary rights at issue in Boeken’s loss of consortium and 
 
 55. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 306 (Cal. 2002); Crowley v. Katleman, 
881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal. 1994), as modified (Nov. 30, 1994). 
 56. 230 P.3d 342 (Cal. 2010). 
 57. Id. at 344. 
 58. Id. at 345. 
 59. Id. (“[F]or purposes of [claim preclusion], a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of 
a final judgment on the merits, barring the entire cause of action.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 345–46. 
 63. Id. at 352. 
 64. Id. at 348. 
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wrongful death actions.65 As it explained, “a wrongful death action 
consists of several separate primary rights: the right to economic 
support, the right to consortium, the right to funeral expenses, and only 
the loss of consortium ‘primary right’ is foreclosed by a prior common 
law loss of consortium action.”66 As later cases show, the court’s split 
decision in Boeken further served to confuse courts in California and 
elsewhere tasked with applying the primary rights approach. 
B.  Defining the Primary Right Since Boeken 
Since Boeken, the California Supreme Court has not addressed 
the “same claim” element of claim preclusion. Thus, California state 
courts and federal courts have attempted to define the “primary right” 
according to Boeken’s perplexing guidance. As the following cases 
illustrate, courts continue to find the doctrine “elusive and subject to 
dispute and misconception.”67 
1.  California Courts 
a.  Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. 
The California Court of Appeal issued a decision in Villacres v. 
ABM Industries, Inc.68 five months after Boeken. In Villacres, a class 
of security guards brought a class action against their employer, 
alleging failure to pay overtime and failure to pay wages for a split 
shift in violation of the California Labor Code.69 The parties reached 
a tentative settlement, and notice of that settlement was mailed to more 
than 11,000 putative class members.70 The settlement stated in part 
that the class members agreed to waive all claims that “could have 
been raised as part of the Plaintiffs’ claims.”71 Carlos Villacres was 
one of those class members; he did not opt out of the class, object to 
the settlement, or seek to intervene in the suit. The parties entered into 
the settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the suit with 
prejudice.72 
 
 65. Id. at 355 (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. 
 67. WITKIN, supra note 24, § 24. 
 68. 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 398 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 69. Id. at 404–05. 
 70. Id. at 405. 
 71. Id. at 406. 
 72. Id. 
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Two days later, Villacres filed a second action against the same 
employer as “an individual on behalf of himself and other aggrieved 
employees.”73 Villacres alleged the following violations of the 
California Labor Code: failure to pay overtime compensation, failure 
to furnish employees with complete wage statements, failure to 
provide meal and rest periods, failure to indemnify employees for 
business expenses and losses, and failure to pay wages on a timely 
basis. He also sought civil penalties and attorney fees under the Labor 
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).74 
The defendant employer filed a motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that Villacres’s second action was barred by the settlement 
and dismissal with prejudice in the first action.75 The trial judge 
agreed, stating that “the claims at issue in [this action] fall into the 
category of claims that could have been asserted in the 
[first] . . . matter.”76 Villacres appealed, arguing that his action did not 
involve a claim that could have been raised in the first action because 
each Labor Code provision involves a distinct primary right, and 
because the recovery of unpaid wages for a Labor Code violation 
involves a different primary right as the recovery of a civil penalty 
under PAGA for the same violation.77 
In a disorienting 2-1 opinion, the appellate court affirmed.78 
Although the majority stated that it “need not decide 
whether . . . every Labor Code violation and PAGA penalty involves 
a separate primary right,” it nevertheless “conclude[d] this suit alleges 
the same cause of action asserted and settled in [the first action].”79 It 
appears the majority meant that Villacres’s suit did indeed constitute 
a “claim that could have been raised” within the meaning of the 
settlement agreement, but the discussion draws on preclusion laws of 
other jurisdictions in coming to that conclusion; it does not explain 
how California’s preclusion law enters into the analysis.80 The 
majority decision is thus more in line with the transactional approach 
than the primary rights approach. 
 
 73. Id. at 407. 
 74. Id. at 407–08. 
 75. Id. at 408. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 408, 413. 
 78. Id. at 404. 
 79. Id. at 414, 422. 
 80. Id. at 418. 
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The dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s merger of claim 
preclusion law and contract interpretation.81 In contrast, the dissent 
separated its claim preclusion discussion from that of its interpretation 
of the contract.82 It first applied the claim preclusion analysis to 
Villacres’s action.83 It agreed that Villacres’s overtime claims were 
barred, but found that his non-overtime claims were not.84 
That plaintiff’s non-overtime claims do not involve the same 
causes of action as the [first action’s] overtime and split-shift 
claims should be plain. A cause of action is identified by 
examining one party’s right and the other’s obligation. An 
employee’s right to receive premium payment for overtime 
stems from the Legislature’s determination that too much 
work in a day or week can be harmful. It is not the same as 
his or her right to receive wages promptly, to receive detailed 
and accurate wage data, to be reimbursed for required 
expenses, or to receive meal and rest breaks.85 
The dissent then analogized the contractual language, “claims that 
could have been raised,” to that language as used in the claim 
preclusion context.86 Because the settlement was entered into in 
California, the dissent found that the parties intended to release only 
claims which would be barred by California claim preclusion law.87 
Thus, the non-overtime claims were barred by neither preclusion law 
nor by the settlement agreement. 
Villacres highlights the difficulty courts have had in harmonizing 
California preclusion law with contractual waivers. Although the 
result reached by the majority is efficient, its analysis is puzzling 
because it is at odds with the primary rights model. 
 
 81. Id. at 423 (Chaney, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 424–30. 
 83. Id. at 424–26. 
 84. Id. at 425–26. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 427 (quoting Price v. Sixth Dist. Agric. Ass’n, 258 P. 387, 391 (Cal. 1927)) (“In 
other words, when an issue has been litigated all inquiry respecting the same is foreclosed, not only 
as to matters heard but also as to matters that could have been heard in support of or in opposition 
thereto.”). 
 87. Villacres, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 428. The dissent explains: “If the parties had intended a 
broader release they could have released ‘all claims,’ or even ‘all claims that could have been 
raised’ in the [prior] litigation, not merely claims that could have been raised ‘as part of’ the 
plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. 
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b.  Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang 
A California appellate court’s attempt in Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang88 
to further clarify the scope of a primary right is similarly perplexing. 
That case involved not one, but two prior actions.89 In the first, 
Fujifilm Corp. (“Fuji”) brought a patent-infringement suit in federal 
court against Yet Chan, Cindy Yang, and others.90 The parties 
executed a settlement agreement under which all defendants except 
Yang agreed to make six payments to Fuji.91 Under the agreement’s 
terms, if those defendants missed a payment, Yang would become 
liable for a portion of the remaining balance equal to the value of any 
property that Chan transferred to her, fraudulently or otherwise.92 
After the defendants missed a payment, Yang refused to pay Fuji.93 
Fuji then filed a second federal suit against Yang for breach of the 
agreement.94 In its complaint, Fuji demanded $700,000 in cash and a 
piece of real property that Chan had transferred to Yang.95 Yang 
argued that the agreement did not apply to those transfers because they 
were made before the agreement’s effective date.96 The district court 
agreed.97 
Fuji then filed a third complaint in California state court, alleging 
that Yang committed fraudulent transfers by transferring assets for the 
purpose of frustrating Fuji’s ability to enforce the agreement.98 Yang 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Fuji’s fraudulent 
transfer claims could have been litigated in the second suit, and thus 
were barred by California’s claim preclusion law.99 The trial court 
rejected Yang’s argument, applying the “harm suffered” approach to 
preclusion in finding that the two suits involved different primary 
rights. 100 It found that “[t]he first harm was Fuji ‘didn’t get paid 
 
 88. 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 89. Id. at 243. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 243–44. Although the second suit was litigated in federal court, California preclusion 
law applied because the federal court sat in diversity and decided issues of California contract law. 
See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 100. Fujifilm Corp., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. 
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money under the settlement agreement. And the [second] harm, based 
on the fraudulent transfer, is [Fuji isn’t] able to collect the money that 
[Fuji is] owed because [Chan] fraudulently transferred assets and, 
therefore, [Fuji has] no place to go.’”101 A jury later found in Fuji’s 
favor, and Yang appealed.102 
On appeal, although Yang urged the court to adopt the 
transactional approach to claim preclusion in reaching its decision, the 
court explicitly refused to consider her request, stating that it was “not 
free to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent.”103 Instead, the 
appellate court, affirming the district court, attempted to clarify the 
“harm suffered” approach to the primary right: “A plaintiff’s primary 
right is defined by the legally protected interest which is harmed by 
defendant’s wrongful act, and is not necessarily coextensive with the 
consequence of that wrongful act.”104 But rather than clarify the 
approach, the court appears to endorse a hybrid analysis that 
appropriates the first of Pomeroy’s three prongs. The court ultimately 
found that “because breaching a contract inflicts harm on a legally 
protected interest different from tortious conduct that renders 
uncollectable a judgment arising from the breach of contract, two 
different primary rights arise.”105 
c.  DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber 
A year later, in DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber,106 the California 
Court of Appeals focused exclusively on primary rights at the expense 
of another requisite claim preclusion element. There, a commercial 
landlord leased property to three individual tenants, who were jointly 
and severally liable.107 The tenants defaulted, and one sued the 
landlord.108 The landlord cross-complained against all three tenants 
but later dismissed two tenants without prejudice.109 After the landlord 
obtained a judgment against the first tenant, he brought a separate 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 246. 
 104. Id. at 245 (quoting Henderson v. Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 
238 (Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied (Apr. 10, 2013), review denied (June 26, 2013)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 352 P.3d 378 (Cal. 2015). 
 107. Id. at 748. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 749. 
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action against the second and third.110 Those tenants demurred on the 
ground that the suit was barred by California’s claim preclusion 
doctrine.111 The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend.112 The landlord appealed.113 
The appellate court affirmed, holding that because the landlord’s 
prior lawsuit was based on the same “primary right” as the second 
suit—the leasehold obligation—the second suit was barred.114 The 
California Supreme Court correctly overturned this decision on the 
ground that it did not satisfy a different element of the claim preclusion 
doctrine—the second and third tenants were not the same as or in 
privity with the first tenant.115 But the appellate court’s decision, 
debating the primary right at the expense of the other requisite claim 
preclusion elements, indicates the distracting nature of California’s 
definition of a claim. 
2.  Federal Courts 
To determine the preclusive effect of a prior state court decision, 
a federal court must apply the law of preclusion used by the state in 
which the decision was rendered.116 Similarly, state law of preclusion 
governs the preclusive effect of federal court actions in which 
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and the issues involved 
are those of state law.117 Thus, federal courts, particularly those in the 
Ninth Circuit, frequently apply California’s outdated preclusion law, 
and thus, must determine the scope of a primary right.118 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 750. 
 112. Id. at 752. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 755. 
 115. DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352 P.3d 378, 387 (Cal. 2015), reh’g denied (Aug. 12, 
2015). 
 116. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2015); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982) 
(“Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments 
that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments 
emerged.”). 
 117. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 50809 (2001). 
 118. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying 
primary rights analysis to find that prisoner’s unsuccessful California habeas petition challenging 
his placement in secure housing unit precluded his subsequent civil rights claim). 
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a.  Wolin v. City of Los Angeles 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit applied California’s primary rights 
approach in Wolin v. City of Los Angeles,119 determining in a 2-1 
decision that a prior suit barred the second because the actions 
involved the same harm suffered.120 Alicia Wolin, an employee with 
the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), filed an administrative 
action with the LAPD on the ground that it had denied her a promotion 
because of her gender, in violation of the terms of a consent decree.121 
After the LAPD denied her claim, she petitioned the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles for a writ of mandate to overturn that denial.122 LAPD 
ultimately prevailed in that action.123 Wolin then filed a second 
complaint in federal court, alleging that LAPD failed to promote her, 
in violation of various state and federal laws.124 The federal court 
dismissed the action on the basis that her second action was barred by 
claim preclusion because they involved the same primary right—
LAPD’s allegedly wrongful refusal to grant her a promotion.125 Wolin 
appealed.126 
The majority affirmed, holding that Wolin’s state and federal 
actions involved the same primary right because “the most significant 
consideration under California’s ‘primary rights’ theory is the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff,” and the harm suffered in both actions was 
Wolin’s lack of promotion.127 Judge Berzon dissented, criticizing the 
majority for addressing only the primary right and not the 
corresponding duty and breach.128 Unlike the majority, she opted for 
the three-prong analysis, explaining that in the first action, the duty 
breached by the LAPD was the duty to comply with hiring targets 
identified in a consent decree, and the harm suffered by Wolin was the 
harm of breach of promise. But in the second action, the duty was not 
to discriminate against an employee on the basis of her sex, and the 
 
 119. 524 F. App’x 331 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 332. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 333. 
 128. Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
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harm she suffered was discrimination.129 Thus, the action involved a 
different primary right and was not barred.130 
The split panel in this decision derived from the California 
Supreme Court’s inability to decisively define a claim. Indeed, both 
opinions applied standards endorsed by the California Supreme Court; 
the majority focused on the Agarwal “harm suffered” analysis, while 
the dissent applied Pomeroy’s three-prong approach. Yet as this case 
illustrates, these two approaches are often incompatible, leading to 
unpredictable judicial definitions of a primary right. 
b.  Inoue v. Bank of America, N.A. 
A district court in the Northern District of California applied 
California’s law of preclusion in Inoue v. Bank of America, N.A.131 
The court’s order further demonstrates the inefficiencies of the 
primary rights approach. Masazumi Inoue filed a wrongful foreclosure 
action against Bank of America in California Superior Court, alleging 
fraud, violations of California mortgage lending statutes, and violation 
of California unfair competition law.132 The court entered judgment in 
Bank of America’s favor.133 
Inoue then filed a second action against Bank of America in 
federal court, alleging wrongful foreclosure, negligence, fraud, 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation 
of California unfair competition law.134 The second action involved 
the same foreclosure sale of the same property as the first suit.135 Bank 
of America moved to dismiss on the ground that the second action was 
barred by claim preclusion.136 The district court agreed.137 It held that 
the actions involved the same claim because they “involve the same 
primary right, or the alleged wrongful foreclosure.”138 It further 
concluded, “[t]hat the plaintiff adds myriad new factual allegations in 
 
 129. Id. at 334 (“[T]he settlement agreement allegedly breached ostensibly provided for 
promotion of individual women who had never been discriminated against, and so did not 
encompass the right to equal protection, which is the basis of Wolin’s § 1983 action.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. No. 15-CV-1636-YGR, 2015 WL 4498570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at *1. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *4. 
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the [federal complaint], mostly related to so-called ‘dual tracking,’ and 
various new state law claims is not relevant to this inquiry.” 
But the “various new state law claims” are relevant to 
California’s claim preclusion inquiry. For example, the state tort 
claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress in 
the second action involve a different primary right—the right to be 
free from emotional distress—than the economic and property rights 
implicated by the fraud and statutory violations alleged in the prior 
action. Both actions do involve the same transaction—Bank of 
America’s allegedly wrongful foreclosure activities, but they involve 
different claims for purposes of the primary rights approach to claim 
preclusion.139 Thus, although the result in this case serves the 
preclusion doctrine’s purposes of fairness and efficiency, its result was 
wrong under California preclusion law. 
IV.  CALIFORNIA SHOULD ADOPT THE SAME TRANSACTION OR 
OCCURRENCE APPROACH TO PRECLUSION 
A.  Abandoning the Primary Right: Two Approaches 
As illustrated by the cases above, California’s attachment to 
primary rights has led to a disorganized preclusion law that hinders 
fairness and efficiency. It does not “prevent[] multifarious law suits,” 
nor does it “protect[] persons from being sued twice in the same cause” 
or “conserve[e] court time by preventing needless relitigation.”140 
Rather than continuing to apply this outdated doctrine, California 
should adopt the transactional approach applied in federal courts and 
recommended by the Restatement. There are two ways California 
could accomplish this. First, the California Supreme Court could 
redefine the doctrine by overruling its precedent and embracing the 
Restatement’s definition of a claim. Alternatively, the California 
legislature could amend the state’s procedural rules to require 
plaintiffs to join together claims arising out of the same transaction or 
to adopt the transactional approach as the state’s rule of preclusion. 
 
 139. Inoue has appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which should address a three-prong 
primary right analysis for each of Inoue’s causes of action. 
 140. Smith, supra note 5, at 414. 
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1.  Through the Courts 
The California Supreme Court can redefine claim preclusion by 
adopting a transactional definition of a claim in favor of the confusing 
and outdated primary rights approach. For example, Idaho adopted the 
Restatement approach in 1983, in Aldape v. Akins.141 As that court 
explained, “the Second Restatement, with its definitive treatment of 
claim preclusion, clarifies the scope of res judicata.”142 By embracing 
the Restatement, the California Supreme Court would not only serve 
the purposes behind claim preclusion, it would also provide 
comprehensive guidance to other California courts by way of the 
Restatement’s text and comments. 
2.  Through the Legislature 
Currently, although the California Civil Procedure Code has a 
permissive joinder statute that allows a plaintiff to join all claims he 
has against any defendant, it does not require a plaintiff to join 
claims.143 Nevertheless, the California Civil Procedure Code does 
require a party against whom a claim is made to plead all 
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as the original 
claims.144 
 
 141. 668 P.2d 130, 134 (Id. Ct. App. 1983) (“We believe the time has come in Idaho to state 
the doctrine of res judicata in terms free from the recrudescent trappings of a cause of action.”). 
 142. Id. Many other states have expressly adopted the Restatement as their law of preclusion. 
E.g., Kauhane v. Acutron Co., Inc., 795 P.2d 276, 279 (Haw. 1990); River Park, Inc. v. City of 
Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (Ill. 1998); Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 879 P.2d 1180, 
119192 (Nev. 1994); Three Rivers Land Co., Inc. v. Maddoux, 652 P.2d 240, 245 (N.M. 1982), 
overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 728 P.2d 467 (N.M. 1986); Hodes 
v. Axelrod 515 N.E.2d 612, 616 (N.Y. 1987); Drews v. EBI Cos., 795 P.2d 531, 536 (Or. 1990). 
 143. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 2015) provides: “A plaintiff who in a complaint, 
alone or with coplaintiffs, alleges a cause of action against one or more defendants may unite with 
such cause any other causes which he has either alone or with any coplaintiffs against any of such 
defendants.” Corresponding sections allow for permissive joinder of claims in cross-complaints. 
See CIV. PROC. §§ 428.10, 428.30. 
 144. CIV. PROC. § 426.30. That statute provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a party against whom a complaint has been 
filed and served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any related cause of action which (at 
the time of serving his answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party 
may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of 
action not pleaded. (b) This section does not apply if either of the following are 
established: (1) The court in which the action is pending does not have jurisdiction to 
render a personal judgment against the person who failed to plead the related cause of 
action. (2) The person who failed to plead the related cause of action did not file an 
answer to the complaint against him. 
Id. 
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As California’s lawmaking body, the California legislature could 
enact legislation guiding the state towards a more modern definition 
of a claim. To do so, it could amend the Civil Procedure Code’s current 
joinder statutes to require mandatory joinder of transactionally-related 
claims. Alternately, it could enact a statute codifying a res judicata 
rule. Similar provisions that other states and the federal courts have 
enacted provide insight into this approach. 
Michigan appears to be the only state that statutorily requires 
plaintiffs to join all transactionally-related claims.145 In contrast, most 
states have modeled their joinder statutes after the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.146 In those states, and in federal courts, a party must 
state as a counterclaim any claim that arises out of the same transaction 
or occurrence as the claim made by the opposing party.147 
Louisiana, on the other hand, codified its transactional approach 
to claim preclusion in a res judicata statute: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final 
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on 
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent: 
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of 
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the 
judgment. 
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of 
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out 
 
 145. Friedenthal, supra note 31, at 11. That statute, MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A) (2015), provides, 
In a pleading that states a claim against an opposing party, the pleader must join every 
claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at the time of serving the pleading, 
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action and 
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court 
cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
Id. Michigan does not have a mandatory counterclaim rule; it is only when a defendant brings one 
counterclaim that this rule requires him to join all transactionally-related claims. See id. 
 146. For example, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted compulsory 
counterclaim rules similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. For a full list, see Trammell, 
supra note 16, at 127678. 
 147. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1). Under that rule, 
A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the 
pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and (B) does not 
require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
Id. 
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of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars 
a subsequent action on those causes of action. . . .148 
A corresponding statute provides three exceptions to the general rule 
barring a second action: when the first action was dismissed without 
prejudice, when the judgment reserved the right to bring a second 
action, and “when exceptional circumstance justify relief.”149 
Of these two options, a codification of the claim preclusion rule 
would better transition California into a modern approach to claim 
preclusion. A mandatory joinder statute would only impliedly address 
a shift to the transactional approach, requiring further input by the 
courts on the preclusive impact of the joinder statute. But a claim 
preclusion statute would expressly tackle the issue, better instructing 
California courts and litigants of the rule’s in-practice operation. 
B.  The Legislature Is the Better Avenue:  
Proposed Revisions to the California Civil Procedure Code 
Although other states have successfully adopted the transactional 
approach through their judiciaries, enacting compulsory joinder or 
claim preclusion rules through the legislature is the more fair and 
efficient approach in California. In 1998, Professor Walter Heiser 
argued that judicial adoption of the Restatement is preferable to action 
by the California legislature.150 Heiser provided three reasons: (1) a 
judicial overruling would be more expeditious; (2) a mandatory 
joinder statute could encourage plaintiffs, in an abundance of caution, 
to allege every conceivable right to relief in one action, and; (3) the 
Restatement is comprehensive in a way that is unlikely to be 
duplicated by legislative action.151 Eighteen years later, the California 
Supreme Court has not yet adopted the Restatement approach. In fact, 
it expressly refused to address the question in a case where the result 
would be the same under either the primary rights or transactional 
approach.152 And neither the majority nor the dissent in Boeken even 
 
 148. LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2015). 
 149. Id. § 13:4232. 
 150. Heiser, supra note 9, at 615–16. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 51 P.3d 297, 309 n.12 (Cal. 2002) (“Amici curiae 
urge this court to abandon the primary right theory and adopt the transactional approach of the 
Restatement Second of Judgments. As the result in this case would be the same under either theory, 
we decline to reconsider our long-standing approach to res judicata.”). 
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mentioned the Restatement, despite the parties addressing the issue in 
their briefing.153 It is time for the California legislature to redirect the 
California Supreme Court’s focus to the policies of fairness and 
efficiency a claim preclusion doctrine is intended to serve. With 
respect to Heiser’s second and third concerns, by enacting a res 
judicata statute, the legislature can expressly address the Restatement 
such that it becomes an important aspect of the legislative history. 
Thus, courts and parties will look to it as persuasive authority in 
defining a claim for purposes of preclusion, limiting the concerns of 
overpleading and lack of guidance. 
A statute has additional benefits. The legislature has the ability to 
tailor a statute so that it does not have retroactive impact on parties 
relying on the current rule of preclusion.154 Furthermore, the 
California Civil Procedure Code, like the Restatement and the 
Louisiana statute, can include equitable considerations in its text to 
allow for judicial discretion and equitable exclusions.155 
1.  Replacing “Cause of Action” with “Claim” 
As an initial matter, California’s use of the term “cause of action” 
“remains elusive and subject to dispute and misconception,” in part 
because courts use the term differently in a variety of contexts.156 To 
remedy these disputes and misconceptions, California should, as 
federal courts did decades ago, replace “cause of action” in the 
preclusion and pleading context with the term “claim.” 
2.  Enacting a Res Judicata Statute 
In light of the foregoing, I propose that California adopt the 
following statute to incorporate the same-transaction-or-occurrence 
approach into its claim preclusion law: 
 
 
 153. See Brief for Appellant at 22, Boeken v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342 (Cal. 
2010) (No. S162029), 2008 WL 4143645, at *22; Brief for Respondent at 36, Boeken v. Philip 
Morris, USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342 (Cal. 2010) (No. S162029), 2008 WL 4736274, at *36. Although 
the Supreme Court did not address the issue, the Court of Appeals suggested in a footnote that the 
result would be the same under either theory of claim preclusion. Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, 
Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 460 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 230 P.3d 342 (Cal. 2010). 
 154. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3 (West 2015) (“No part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared.”). 
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, § 26. Indeed, the California 
Civil Procedure Code states that its provisions are to be liberally construed. CIV. PROC. § 4 (2015). 
 156. WITKIN, supra note 24, § 35. 
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(1) Definitions. 
(a) A “claim” includes all rights of a party to remedies 
against an opposing party in an action with respect 
to all or any part of the transaction or series of 
transactions out of which the action arose. 
(b) A “defendant” is the party against whom a claim is 
made. 
(c) A “plaintiff” is the party who makes a claim against 
an opposing party. 
(2) Valid and Final Judgment Conclusive. A valid and 
final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, 
except on appeal or other direct review, to the following 
extent: 
(a) Judgment for Plaintiff. When the judgment is 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff: 
(i) The judgment extinguishes all actions on the 
same claim or any part thereof and those actions 
are merged in the judgment; and 
(ii) The plaintiff may maintain an action upon the 
judgment; and 
(iii) In an action upon the judgment, the defendant 
cannot avail himself of defenses he might have 
interposed, or did interpose, in the action in 
which the judgment was rendered. 
(b) Judgment for Defendant. When the judgment is 
rendered in favor of the defendant, the judgment 
extinguishes and bars all actions on the same claim 
or any part thereof. 
(3) Exceptions. A judgment, although valid and final, does 
not bar subsequent actions on the same claim: 
(a) When the judgment dismissed the first action 
without prejudice; 
(b) When the judgment reserved the right of a party to 
bring another action; 
(c) When exceptional circumstances justify relief; or 
(d) When otherwise provided by law. 
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This proposed statute incorporates the same-transaction-or-
occurrence definition of a claim as recommended by the Restatement. 
Furthermore, it draws upon the language of the Restatement such that 
courts applying and interpreting the statute can refer to the 
comprehensive commentary to the Restatement and to federal and 
state courts applying the Restatement to guide their decisions.157 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 1924, Charles Clark harshly criticized the primary rights 
approach as naïve, meaningless, and elusive.158 In 1950, a federal 
appellate court recognized that the meaning of claim “is much broader 
today than it was earlier”—i.e., when code pleading limited a 
plaintiff’s opportunity to litigate different legal theories in a single 
action.159 In 1982, the American Law Institute published the Second 
Restatement, promoting the same-transaction-or-occurrence approach 
in “respon[se] to modern procedural ideas which have found 
expression in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other 
procedural systems.”160 In 2011, the United States Supreme Court 
gave its seal of approval to the transactional approach as the accepted 
test in preclusion law.161 In 2017, 49 states and the District of 
Columbia apply the Restatement approach or some modification of 
it.162 In 2017, California continues to cling to the primary rights 




 157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, §§ 18–20, 24. 
 158. See Clark, supra note 1, at 826. 
 159. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1950). 
 160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, § 24, cmt. a. 
 161. United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 316 (2011). 
 162. See Trammell, supra note 16, at 1276–78. 
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